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From 1975 until 1990, Lebanon experienced a Civil War that further entrenched sectarian 
division in its cities. In the country’s capital, Beirut, these divisions were most apparent. 
Today, the fragmentation that resulted from the war persists, and little opportunity exists 
in Beirut’s built environment to facilitate integration. Public spaces in Beirut have been 
regularly transformed into what Dr. Aseel Sawalha calls “prohibited space,” spaces that 
were formerly inclusive but now exclude the majority of the population. Drawing from 
existing research on Lebanon’s real estate and urban development industries, this article 
demonstrates how development and reconstruction since the Civil War have shaped 
Beirut’s minimal public space into “prohibited space.” This analysis of three formerly 
public spaces argues that the self-interest of politicians, the legislation catered towards 
the real estate and development sector, and the prioritization of an internationally 
attractive cosmopolitan image have transformed Beirut’s built environment into privatized 
space. Public space in a divided city plays a valuable role in unifying fragmented 
neighborhoods by providing established spaces that produce interaction and communal 
understanding in a city that needs healing across sectarian divides. 
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T he late British social scientist and geographer Doreen Massey spoke of 
space as being alive – as being actively part 
of a collection of stories in which we are all 
physically living at any given moment. Massey 
argued that social spaces tell the stories of 
relationships between various entities. These 
relationships contain power. Within a certain 
space, one finds what Massey calls the 
“geography of power,” that the distribution of 
those relations mirrors the power relations 
with the society we have.”1 
From 1975 until 1990, Lebanon experienced 
a civil war resulting in immense property 
destruction, internal displacement of one 
million people, and the death of over 100,000 
people.2 During this 15-year period, people’s 
relationships with the once heterogeneous 
spaces of the city changed. In Beirut, a 
demarcation line known as the Green Line 
divided the city along religious lines, forming 
a Christian East and Muslim West. Secure 
and controlled spaces, such as shopping 
centers with guards, became safe havens 
in the midst of rampant instability and fear. 
Political parties often controlled these 
homogenous spaces according to their 
sects.3 To this day, the fragmentation of 
Beirut’s neighborhoods and its subdivisions 
persists.4 
The spaces of Beirut contain a myriad of 
stories. Since the Civil War, different authors, 
including politicians, real estate companies, 
and civil society actors have fought to 
construct a dominant narrative for the city. 
The relationship between power and space 
is intrinsically linked in these narratives. In 
the early 1990s, Lebanon’s prime minister 
Rafik Hariri saw post-war reconstruction 
as an opportunity to change Beirut’s image 
to appeal to global investors and compete 
with other cities internationally as a tourist 
destination. Hariri tasked joint-stock 
company Solidere to manage reconstruction 
of Beirut’s Central District (BCD). While 
only 30 percent of buildings in BCD were 
destroyed in the Civil War, 80 percent of 
those remaining were destroyed by Solidere.5 
Harriri hoped to attract investors with the 
creation of a central district comparable with 
other city centers along the Mediterranean.6 
This marked the start of political and 
economic interests converging to produce 
the real estate and development sector’s 
dominance in a country that was still reeling 
from sectarian divisions. 
Power is at the forefront of the story of 
space in Beirut. Real estate development 
and private interests yield power to work 
together to maximize profit at the expense of 
communal spaces for residents of the city. 
Looking at public space reveals issues of 
power and exclusion.7 In Beirut, public space 
has consistently transitioned into what Dr. 
Aseel Sawalha calls “prohibited space:”
Urban sites that were originally ‘public’ 
and within reach for the majority of 
the city residents but, because of the 
war and the various urban renewal 
projects, had become ‘private,’ that is, 
inaccessible and out of reach for the 
majority of the population.8
This privatization has been a direct 
consequence of real estate development 
and private interests. While politicians and 
developers profit, the people of Beirut and 
the country are left without public spaces to 
be part of a mingling public. 
Beirut’s ‘geography of power’ shows the 
forces shaping three formerly public spaces 
into prohibited spaces: Beirut Souks, the 
Daliyeh waterfront, and Ramlet Al-Bayda 
Beach. The existance of public spaces in 
a divided city works to unify fragmented 
neighborhoods. However, the normalization 
of prohibited spaces in Beirut has actively 
reduced opportunities for healing across 
sectarian divides.
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT 
AND PUBLIC SPACES IN BEIRUT
Since the Civil War, construction has 
targeted public spaces in Beirut with the 
justification of its potential addition to “the 
vibrancy of economic liberalism and a 
booming real estate market.”9 The aftermath 
of the Civil War presented an opportunity 
to use reconstruction as a way to bring 
Lebanon’s various communities together; 
instead, the government allocated time and 
resources to make way for development. 
These investments resulted in a series of 
transformations that made much of Beirut 
exclusive. Instead of aiding the social 
cohesion of society, Beirut’s development 
has created exclusive spaces from those 
that were heterogeneous and accessible to 
a majority of the population before the Civil 
War. 
Real estate and construction’s contributions 
to Lebanon’s gross domestic product (GDP)
have risen from roughly 13 percent in 1973 
to 21 percent in 2014.10 State actors and 
members of political parties across sectarian 
divisions are directly invested in real estate 
and construction.11 Layers of investment 
conceal political actors’ direct connections 
to developments, a particularly beneficial 
strategy with controversial developments that 
have received intense political backlash.
Beirut Souks and two sites on the 
Mediterranean Coast, the Daliyeh Waterfront 
and Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach, reveal overlaps 
between the individuals writing the laws and 
those serving to gain from development. 
Those in power permit the elite to replace 
Beirut’s formerly public spaces with real 
estate development. Before the war, people 
across class, sectarian,and gender lines 
frequented Beirut’s public spaces. While 
divisions exist in every society, space for 
interaction and moments of unity existed. 
While these public spaces were once open 
and accessible, they now prohibit access. 
What was once heterogeneous and alive 
has been reconstructed to cater to the elite, 
propagating further division. 
BEIRUT SOUKS
The reconstruction of Beirut’s historical 
market area serves as a prime example of 
economic and state interests converging at 
the expense of local residents’public spaces. 
Prior to the Civil War, Beirut’s city center had 
a famous market (suk/souk/suq) area that 
consisted of three streets: Ayyas, Tawileh, 
and Jamil.12 According to Samir Khalaf, “this 
old, dense street grid with access gates, open 
squares, and sheltered water fountains was 
scaleable, colorful, and accommodated a 
dazzling variety of outlets, ranging from the 
little mangy-looking shops with makeshift 
vending stalls to specialized stores and 
upmarket fashionable boutiques” (Figure 1).13
In 1991, immediately after the Civil War’s 
end, the Hariri government passed Law 117, 
which “involved the erasure of right-holder’s 
claims to 5,043 homes and apartments, 7,092 
shops and businesses, 5,597 offices and 
1,368 workshops and 702 warehouses, 343 
hotels, 361 restaurants and 45 bars that had 
animated the pre-war suq.”14 Prime Minister 
Hariri appointed the joint stock company, 
Solidere, to handle reconstruction of BCD in 
Figure 1:  Beirut  Souks in the 1960s (OldTime 
Beirut ,  2018) .
1994. While Hariri was heavily involved in real 
estate prior to being prime minister, many 
people believe that Hariri owned more than 
50 percent of Solidere’s shares at the time of 
reconstruction in the 90s.15 The 200 hectares 
the company redeveloped was valued at 
nearly 25 percent of Lebanon’s GDP.16 With 
the passing of Law 117, Solidere demolished 
the souk and replaced it with a shopping 
mall, banking area, and a series of expensive 
gated communities.17 
In a panel at the Lebanese American 
University in 2015, Solidere’s urban planning 
manager, Amira Solh, emphasized the 
dangers of relying on private interests to 
create public space, saying that “private 
interests want a return on their goods, so 
therefore they want it to be public insomuch 
as it serves them...so there is kind of a 
need to say this is controlled.”18 Today, local 
residents recall the markets with nostalgia 
and remember them as a space where a 
diverse group of people could exist and 
interact in the haphazardness of the souks. 
The Beirut Souks in BCD are part of a trend 
in Beirut’s urban development that leads 
to exclusive affordability-based senses of 
‘belonging.’ In other words, it leads to more 
isolated individuals who engage with different 
spaces based on what they can afford.
Figure 2:  Beirut  Souks by N.  Karim (Wikipedia 
Commons,  2011) .
Beirut Souks, like much of what Solidere 
considers public space in BCD, are now 
under surveillance by security guards who 
limit their uses. Guards are permitted to 
question anyone who may seem suspicious 
or even forbid entry. In addition, vendors 
and beggars are forbidden access to keep 
the space secured, ordered and clean.19 
All of these guidelines establish a ‘classy 
cosmopolitan’ urban environment that works 
to solely permit those who fit a certain image.
The surveillance makes people who do not fit 
into this image, based on their religious sect 
or income levels, unwelcome and excluded 
from the space.20 
While the BCD and its historical market once 
served as a public space for the intermingling 
of all identities, the reduction of affordability 
and accessibility restricts access to the 
space. Nagle argues that “the reconstruction 
of the city center further obscures and 
even reinforces the contemporary process 
of postwar ethnic segmentation and 
territorialization of the city by constructing 
public space that could be used as a vital 
meeting point for citizens to meet and 
interact.”21 Beirut needs public space to 
help with post-war healing, but this trend of 
urbanization seen in BCD privatizes space 
and perpetuates division, a trend which also 
exists on the Mediterranean Coast.
THE MEDITERRANEAN COAST: 
DALIYEH AND RAMLET 
AL-BAYDA BEACH
Historically, Lebanon’s coast served as a 
place for the public. In 1915, a law declared 
that “the sea’s shore until the farthest 
area reached by waves during winter, as 
well as sand and rockshores, belong to the 
public.”22 Additionally, Beirut’s 1954 Master 
Plan banned any construction in Zone 10, an 
area owned by different families consisting 
of various seaside plots spanning from 
the Raouche (Daliyeh waterfront area) to 
Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach.23 Inspired by the 
French style of coastal care, the Lebanese 
government entrusted the care of the coast 
to the families who owned plots of land along 
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it.24 Since the end of the Civil War, however, 
the Mediterranean coast has grown to hold 
exclusive spaces like resorts and hotels that 
are not accessible to a large proportion of the 
population.25 
Through a series of laws passed by the 
well-connected financial elite and politicians 
chasing personal and economic interests, 
real estate developments have transformed 
public spaces, like the Daliyeh waterfront 
and Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach, into prohibited 
spaces no longer accessible to the majority of 
the population. 
Dal iyeh Waterfront:  Part  of  a 
Prohibited Coastl ine
Figure 3:  Dal iyeh of  Raouche in the 1960s 
(OldTime Beirut ,  2018) .
The Daliyeh, also known as Daliyeh of 
Raouche, is a rocky waterfront area in Beirut. 
In the midst of the reconstruction frenzy 
along the coast following the Civil War, the 
Daliyeh served as an inclusive place where 
working-class families could picnic and 
swim. In 2014, however, the area was closed 
to make way for a development project that 
would cover the majority of the natural 
outcrop.26 
The legal framework that allowed for 
developments like those on the Daliyeh and 
other parts of the coast began with decrees 
and laws passed in the 1960s. In 1966, the 
passing of Decree 4810 allowed “owners 
of property adjacent to the sea to privately 
exploit the maritime public domain.”27 This 
was only permitted with the condition that, 
if any public domain was used, 25 percent of 
the land must be given to the municipality of 
Beirut for public use.28 
During the Civil War, many developers and 
financial elites took advantage of the chaos 
and began building resorts along the coast. 
Though this was illegal, many of the elite, and 
often leaders of various militias in the war, 
became members of parliament and gained 
the ability to transform legislation.29 In 1989, 
in the final stretch of the Civil War, Decree 
169 shifted the currents in favor of real estate 
development. The decree not only eliminated 
the 25 percent requirement mandated 
in  former Decree 4810 (1966), but it also 
allowed for construction in Zone 10.30 Decree 
169 was heavily contested by the civil society 
and coalitions filing a lawsuit against the 
Lebanese government for the development 
project on the Daliyeh. Organizers of the 
lawsuit claimed the 1989 decree was not 
publicized nor approved by governmental 
bodies and argued that “developers held 
close ties to the politicians who passed it.”31
Prior to the passage of the decree, a member 
of the Al-Daher family, a businessman and 
member of the financial elite, wished to 
develop the Mövenpick Hotel along the coast. 
While the development would have violated 
former decrees, the Al-Daher family had 
many connections amongst the powerful 
militias and politicians of the time. They 
developed the hotel under the name of the 
Merriland Company. Amir Saksouk-Sasso 
and Nadine Bekdache argue that “decree 
number 169 was tailored and issued in 1989 
to enable the Merriland Company to build a 
large hotel project in the bay, contravening 
existing legislation.”32
The Daliyeh used to be a place that welcomed 
those who had lost access to the sea due to 
restrictive entrance fees.33 Over the years, 
it “provided sustainable livelihood for many 
Figure 4:  Dal iyeh of  Raouche Waterfront 
Fenced Off  (World Monument Fund,  2014) .
low-income city dwellers and hosted many 
cultural activities such as the Kurds’ Nawroz 
[New Year].”34 In 2016, The Civil Campaign to 
Protect the Dalieh of Raouche added Daliyeh 
to the World Monument Fund’s (WMF) watch 
list, supporting its heritage preservation. 
Despite this, a fence continues to surround 
the Daliyeh, a space that exists as part of 
the 20 percent of remaining coastline under 
threat of development.35
Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach: A 
Shrinking Publ ic  Beach 
In recent years, laws and regulations leaving 
much of the coastline at the disposal of real 
estate and construction have endangered 
and infringed upon Beirut’s last remaining 
public beach, Ramlet Al-Bayda. In a country 
with hot summers and unreliable electricity, 
many low-income residents saw the beach 
as a refuge and space to socialize.36 And yet, 
due to neglect by the municipality, the last 
public beach in Beirut was littered with trash 
and poorly maintained,37 and sewage disposal 
contributed to dangerous levels of bacteria in 
the water.38
In 2017, a five-star resort, Lancaster Eden 
Bay, opened on the Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach. 
At over 22,000 square meters, the resort 
boasts to potential renters “the exclusivity 
Figure 5:  Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach with 
Lancaster Eden Bay resortdevelopmentin the 
background.  (Greg Demarque/Executive) .
of your own private community in the city.”39 
Throughout the resort’s development 
process, residents organized to protest 
what they considered an infringement 
on their rights to the beach and sea. In 
response to the protests, the Lebanese 
State Council suspended the construction 
permit. Despite resistance to the resort’s 
development, construction persisted to 
completion, successfully turning much of 
the last remaining public beach exclusive.40 
The creation of the resort and the addition of 
yet another prohibited space along Beirut’s 
Mediterranean coast shrank an already small 
public space. 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SPACE IN 
A DIVIDED CITY
The cases of Beirut Souks, the Daliyeh 
waterfront, and Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach 
exemplify Christine Mady’s argument that 
“social relations and practices that generate 
heterogeneous public spaces seem to be 
eradicated not only by immediate conflicts 
but also by post-conflict narratives.”41 
The nature and politics of post-Civil War 
reconstruction and urban development has 
created a narrative that excludes and actively 
reduces access to public spaces. United 
Nations (UN) Habitat defines public space 
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the 25 percent requirement mandated 
in  former Decree 4810 (1966), but it also 
allowed for construction in Zone 10.30 Decree 
169 was heavily contested by the civil society 
and coalitions filing a lawsuit against the 
Lebanese government for the development 
project on the Daliyeh. Organizers of the 
lawsuit claimed the 1989 decree was not 
publicized nor approved by governmental 
bodies and argued that “developers held 
close ties to the politicians who passed it.”31
Prior to the passage of the decree, a member 
of the Al-Daher family, a businessman and 
member of the financial elite, wished to 
develop the Mövenpick Hotel along the coast. 
While the development would have violated 
former decrees, the Al-Daher family had 
many connections amongst the powerful 
militias and politicians of the time. They 
developed the hotel under the name of the 
Merriland Company. Amir Saksouk-Sasso 
and Nadine Bekdache argue that “decree 
number 169 was tailored and issued in 1989 
to enable the Merriland Company to build a 
large hotel project in the bay, contravening 
existing legislation.”32
The Daliyeh used to be a place that welcomed 
those who had lost access to the sea due to 
restrictive entrance fees.33 Over the years, 
it “provided sustainable livelihood for many 
Figure 4:  Dal iyeh of  Raouche Waterfront 
Fenced Off  (World Monument Fund,  2014) .
low-income city dwellers and hosted many 
cultural activities such as the Kurds’ Nawroz 
[New Year].”34 In 2016, The Civil Campaign to 
Protect the Dalieh of Raouche added Daliyeh 
to the World Monument Fund’s (WMF) watch 
list, supporting its heritage preservation. 
Despite this, a fence continues to surround 
the Daliyeh, a space that exists as part of 
the 20 percent of remaining coastline under 
threat of development.35
Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach: A 
Shrinking Publ ic  Beach 
In recent years, laws and regulations leaving 
much of the coastline at the disposal of real 
estate and construction have endangered 
and infringed upon Beirut’s last remaining 
public beach, Ramlet Al-Bayda. In a country 
with hot summers and unreliable electricity, 
many low-income residents saw the beach 
as a refuge and space to socialize.36 And yet, 
due to neglect by the municipality, the last 
public beach in Beirut was littered with trash 
and poorly maintained,37 and sewage disposal 
contributed to dangerous levels of bacteria in 
the water.38
In 2017, a five-star resort, Lancaster Eden 
Bay, opened on the Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach. 
At over 22,000 square meters, the resort 
boasts to potential renters “the exclusivity 
Figure 5:  Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach with 
Lancaster Eden Bay resortdevelopmentin the 
background.  (Greg Demarque/Executive) .
of your own private community in the city.”39 
Throughout the resort’s development 
process, residents organized to protest 
what they considered an infringement 
on their rights to the beach and sea. In 
response to the protests, the Lebanese 
State Council suspended the construction 
permit. Despite resistance to the resort’s 
development, construction persisted to 
completion, successfully turning much of 
the last remaining public beach exclusive.40 
The creation of the resort and the addition of 
yet another prohibited space along Beirut’s 
Mediterranean coast shrank an already small 
public space. 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SPACE IN 
A DIVIDED CITY
The cases of Beirut Souks, the Daliyeh 
waterfront, and Ramlet Al-Bayda Beach 
exemplify Christine Mady’s argument that 
“social relations and practices that generate 
heterogeneous public spaces seem to be 
eradicated not only by immediate conflicts 
but also by post-conflict narratives.”41 
The nature and politics of post-Civil War 
reconstruction and urban development has 
created a narrative that excludes and actively 
reduces access to public spaces. United 
Nations (UN) Habitat defines public space 
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as promoting social cohesion and pluralism, 
serving as spaces where a diverse group of 
people can come together and interact.42 
About two-thirds of Lebanese citizens 
were uprooted from their communities 
during the Civil War, and these displaced 
groups integrated themselves into more 
homogenous and exclusive spaces, creating 
a stark sectarian redistribution across 
cities like Beirut. For example, the Muslim 
population of East Beirut shifted from 40 
percent to only five percent.43 Samir Khalaf 
argues that while this redistribution may have 
helped certain groups survive the fighting 
of the war, it is now making it difficult “as 
[communities] are considering options for 
rearranging and sharing common spaces and 
forging unified national identities.”44
Sectarianism’s prevalence in the social and 
political life of residents has not weakened 
in the post-war era. Ethnic quotas exist 
throughout Lebanon’s political framework. 
For example, in 1989, the Taif Agreement 
established what Hiba Bou Akar calls a 
“sectarian-based power-sharing system.”45 
This agreement solidified a governmental 
structure with a quota mandating a Maronite 
Christian President, Sunni Muslim Prime 
Minister, and Shiite Muslim Speaker, and 
set a balance of Christian and Muslim 
representatives for parliamentary seats.46 Not 
only did the law explicitly mandate sectarian 
division,but it created a system in which 
sectarian parties managed welfare services.47 
These legal structures culminated to create 
a society that encourages loyalty to one’s 
sectarian identity over a national one.48
Public spaces provide an opportunity; they 
increase chances for interaction amongst 
all people. When real estate developments 
infringe upon and destroy public spaces, 
these chances for interaction decrease. 
NAHNOO (meaning we in Arabic) is a 
prominent organization working to protect 
and improve public spaces to support better 
navigation and opportunities in a sectarian 
society. NAHNOO believes public spaces 
play a primary role in bringing different 
communities together. They regard the 
lack of public spaces in Lebanon “as a 
crucial factor contributing to continuing 
social tensions within Lebanon’s urban 
agglomerates.”49 NAHNOO is one of many 
forces fighting the privatization of Beirut’s 
public spaces and defending Beirut’s built 
environment from being completely altered 
by real estate development. 
The presence or absence of public space 
sends a clear message about who is deemed 
valuable by those making decisions regarding 
the built environment. Hiba Bou Akar is 
part of a research-oriented art collective, 
Dictaphone Group, working to reunite 
Lebanese citizens with public spaces. In 
2016, Bou Akar told Huck Magazine: “When 
discussing public space in Beirut, the State 
talks in terms of an abstract citizen that fits 
a very specific idea of what an appropriate 
user should be – someone who looks and 
behaves as a ‘proper’ middle-upper class 
European citizen and that’s not based on 
what the public really is.”50 This desire 
to cater to “appropriate users” results in 
exclusive urban spaces reproducing an urban 
environment that boosts real estate value 
and thus creates an economic incentive 
for private and state interests to continue 
producing prohibited spaces. 
After the Civil War, the policies governing 
urban development made it easier for real 
estate to build developments such as resorts 
and expensive shopping malls at the expense 
of public space. Profit has been prioritized 
over the communities’ social cohesion.51 The 
construction of these ‘prohibited’ spaces 
has become so normalized, and the state 
is making little investment to preserve 
the continuously shrinking public space of 
Beirut. This lack of investment has persisted 
since the 1990s. A government wishing to 
unify a country after a conflict so focused on 
religious division should invest not only to 
protect existing public spaces, but to create 
more of them – to actively produce genuinely 
public spaces that increase chances for 
integration and the construction of a national 
identity like “historic buildings, monuments, 
memorials and landmarks.”52
The practice of investing in public spaces in 
Beirut could change the lives and behaviors 
of its people. Public space fosters the 
practice of being part of a public. Doreen 
Massey argues that place can change people 
through encouraging a certain ‘practice’ 
of place. Place forces people to negotiate 
constantly – they must operate in relation 
to the actions and lives of others. Massey 
believes that place is an “arena where 
negotiation is forced upon us.”53 Jane Jacobs 
also echoes this idea in her concept of the 
intricate street ballet of a city. She believes 
each person in a city is part of “an intricate 
ballet in which the individual dancers and 
ensembles all have distinctive parts which 
miraculously reinforce each other and 
compose an orderly whole.”54 The conversion 
of public space in Beirut to prohibited space 
has actively constricted these negotiations 
and dances between people of different 
religious sects and social classes. It 
has removed opportunities to practice 
togetherness, a practice the people of Beirut 
and Lebanon cannot afford to lose.
CONCLUSION
At the forefront of Beirut’s ‘geography of 
power’ lies the self-interest of politicians, 
the legislation catered towards the real 
estate and development sector, and the 
prioritization of an ‘internationally attractive’ 
cosmopolitan image. Its social spaces tell 
the story of uneven power dynamics with 
the average citizen ignored on its pages. 
Prohibited spaces subject the citizens of 
Beirut to a conditional belonging based 
on affordability and accessibility. Whether 
replacing diverse markets with upper-
class shops or constructing a resort that 
covers the coast, the end result is the same: 
formerly inclusive spaces are now exclusive. 
This exclusivity erases the pluralism that 
previously existed in the same spaces. 
In a country with sectarian division engrained 
into communities’ memories and daily lived 
experiences, it is incredibly important to 
invest in public spaces. While real estate 
development provides economic benefits, 
designing spaces for all people provides an 
equal, if not greater, social value. A city with 
spaces for the people, not just those who 
fit the image of a globally competitive city, 
creates opportunities for interaction that 
can lessen tension between communities of 
different religious identities. 
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